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The effect of individual differences in working memory in older adults
on performance with different degrees of automated technology
A leading hypothesis to explain older adults’ over-dependence on automation is
age-related declines in working memory. However, it has not been empirically
examined. The purpose of the current experiment was to examine how working
memory affected performance with different degrees of automation in older
adults. In contrast to the well-supported idea that higher degrees of automation,
when the automation is correct, benefits performance but higher degrees of
automation, when the automation fails, increasingly harms performance, older
adults benefited from higher degrees of automation when the automation was
correct but were not differentially harmed by automation failures. Surprisingly,
working memory did not interact with degree of automation but did interact with
automation correctness or failure. When automation was correct, older adults
with higher working memory ability had better performance than those with
lower abilities. But when automation was incorrect, all older adults, regardless of
working memory ability, performed poorly.
Practitioners summary: The design of automation intended for older adults should
focus on ways of making the correctness of the automation apparent to the older
user and suggest ways of helping them recover when it is malfunctioning.
Keywords: working memory, degree of automation, older adults, trust,
complacency, automation bias

1.0 Introduction
As automated technology appears in more work and home settings, it is important to
understand how all types of users perform with automation, however previous research
has tended to focus on younger users. The cognitive support provided by automated
technologies may be even more important for older adults. Contrary to commonly held
stereotypes, older adults are very open to technological assistance (Mitzner et al., 2010).
For example, automated technologies can support independent mobility (personal GPS
devices, autonomous vehicles), health (blood glucose meters), and finances (online

banking). Automated technologies may be key to helping older adults maintain an
independent (i.e., outside of an assisted living facility) and productive lifestyle.
Although the study of age-related differences in performance with automated
technology has been sparse (see Hoff & Bashir, 2015 for a brief review), one of the
most consistent findings in this literature is that older adults tend to over-depend and
over-trust automation compared to other age groups (Donmez, Boyle, Lee, McGehee,
2006; Fox & Boehm-Davis, 1998; Ho, Wheatley, & Scialfa, 2005; Lee et al, 1997; Pak
et al., 2012, 2014). An illustrative example is that compared to younger adults, older
adults were more likely to trust in-vehicle distraction mitigation technology even when
it was demonstrated to be incorrect (Donmez, Boyle, Lee, & McGehee, 2006). This
could be seen as yet another example of the paradoxical observation in aging research
that show sharp inconsistencies between older adults’ beliefs about their ability and
actual performance (de Winter, Dodou, & Hancock, 2015). This paradoxical behaviour
with automation presents a possibly dangerous situation (e.g., Hancock, 2014)
especially if older adults, who could benefit most from the use of automation to
maintain an independent and engaged life, end up over-depending on imperfect
automation.

1.1 Older Adults and Automation
A leading hypothesis to explain older adults’ characteristic performance with
automation is age-related decline in working memory (Ho, Kiff, Plocher, & Haigh,
2005; Ho, Wheatley, & Scialfa, 2005). Working memory is the ability to maintain
information over a short period despite distraction, but also the capacity for controlled
processing (Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999; Unsworth & Engle, 2007). In
one study, Ho, Wheatley, and Scialfa had younger and older adults take appropriate
medications at the right time and dose using an imperfectly automated medication

management (AMM) system. When it was time to take one of four medications, the
AMM displayed a message indicating medication and dosage. Compared to younger
adults, older adults were more compliant with (uncritically agreeing) and reliant on (not
verifying) the AMM. The authors explained that this pattern was likely due to agerelated differences in working memory. Their reasoning was that younger adults with
presumably higher working memory abilities were likely using a strategy where they
simply remembered the medication regimen and thus did not need to use the AMM; a
strategy older adults could not use given their reduced working memory abilities. Lee
and Moray (1994) found that when self-confidence in a task is lower than their
perceived trust, participants tended to depend on automation. Thus, older adults’
awareness of their declining memory abilities may have contributed to a sharply
reduced self-confidence in their ability to carry out the task compared to their level of
trust in automation leading to their higher dependence on the AMM.
Ho, Kiff, Plocher, and Haigh (2005) theorised another possible way in which
age deficits in working memory might affect automation behaviour. The acquisition of
mental models is known to be working memory dependent (Gilbert & Rogers, 1999);
thus age-related declines in working memory may result in incomplete or inaccurate
representations of the task leading them to use automation more frequently. However, it
is possible that the same working memory declines may cause older adults to develop
inaccurate mental representations of automation itself leading to poorer performance
with automation (Kieras & Bovair, 1984). Sheridan (1992) referred to this as a user’s
ability to understand automation and suggested that accurate mental representations of
automation are important to performance (Sarter, Mumaw, & Wickens, 2007). The
relationship between older adults’ less accurate mental representation of automation and
poorer performance was also found in a study by Olson, Fisk, and Rogers (2011).

Older adults’ increased tendency to comply with and rely on automation even
when that automation is incorrect was also observed in a study by McBride, Fisk, and
Rogers (2011). The goal of their study was to examine the effect of workload and age
on compliance with and reliance on an automated warehouse management system
(AWMS). Compliance is a behaviour where the operator adheres to unreliable
automation while reliance is where the operator does not act (such as not verifying)
when the automation fails to alert (Dixon, Wickens, & McCarley, 2007). They found
that, while increased workload affected younger adult’s compliance with and reliance
on automation, older adults were unaffected by workload but had generally high
compliance and reliance rates compared to younger adults. Because the focus of their
study was on the effect of workload on age-related differences in automation
compliance and reliance, they did not attempt to explain the source of older adults
generally higher levels of compliance and reliance with automation.
What is noteworthy about Ho, Wheatley, and Scialfa’s (2005) and McBride,
Fisk, and Rogers’ (2011) studies was that both systems were examples of alerting or
warning automation which represent a lower degree of automation support (Onnasch,
Wickens, Li, & Manzey, 2014). Degree of automation is a concept that describes what
and how much a task is being automated (Onnasch, Wickens, Li, & Manzey; Wickens,
Li, Santamaria, Sebok, & Sarter, 2010). It is a more convenient way to express what is
being automated (stages) and by how much (levels). Higher degrees could indicate both
increased stage of automation or increased level of automation (Wickens, Li,
Santamaria, Sebok, & Sarter, 2010). The purpose of alerting automation is to monitor
the environment to gather and analyse information and inform the user so they can shift
attention, but it is the user’s responsibility to interpret the automation and make a
decision. For example, the AMM used by Ho, Wheatley, and Scialfa (2005), monitored

time to take medication while the AWMS used by McBride, Fisk, and Rogers (2011)
alerted the user to the presence of specific packages or filled trucks in the warehouse.
These kinds of automated systems are thought to rely on attentional abilities and
attentional strategies, particularly when reliability is low (Onnasch, Ruff, & Manzey,
2014). But it is interesting to note that while Ho, Wheatley, and Scialfa (2005) found
that older adults increased their monitoring, it did not improve performance. For this
reason, they ruled out age-differences in attention as an explanation for age-related
differences in automation behaviour and hypothesised age-related differences in
working memory as the reason for older adult’s poorer performance.
Alerting automation is contrasted with decision aids, a higher degree of
automation, that assists a user in making a decision in an uncertain or time-constrained
situation (Bahner, Hüper, & Manzey, 2008; Skitka, Mosier, & Burdick, 1999).
Compared to alerting automation, decision aids carry out relatively more of the task
while the user does less (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000). While the
literature on aging and automation has mainly focused on alerting automation, Pak et al
(2012) examined older adults using decision aids and found that older adults also had
generally high levels of trust compared to younger adults. However, the focus of their
study was trust and the design of automation so they did not examine the relationship of
working memory or other abilities on older adults trust and dependence on automation.

1.2 Working Memory and Degrees of Automation
Studies with younger adults have established the importance of working memory on
how users respond to automated technologies, albeit indirectly (de Visser, Shaw,
Mohamed-Ameen, and Parasuraman, 2010; Saqer, de Visser, Emfield & Parasuraman,
2011; Parasuraman, de Visser, Lin, & Greenwood, 2012; McKendrick, Shaw, de Visser,
Saqer, Kidwell, & Parasuraman, 2013; Ahmed, de Visser, Shaw, Mohamed-Ameen,

Campbell, & Parasuraman, 2014; [blinded], in review). Neuro-genetic evidence from
Parasuraman, de Visser, Lin, and Greenwood showed that individuals who possessed
genes that appear to be related to lower working memory, showed greater negative
performance effects when the automation failed than the group possessing genes related
to higher working memory. The authors theorised that low working memory
individuals have a reduced ability to update the contents of working memory which
reduces the amount of time and resources available to consider and confirm an
automation failure. However, the results of the study only indirectly implicated effects
of working memory on automation performance because working memory ability
scores were not obtained and the authors stress the need to directly examine the role of
working memory on the appropriate use of automation.
More direct evidence of the importance of working memory was found in a
recent study by [blinded] (in review). The researchers wanted to examine the purported
link between working memory but to also extend the research to examine different
degrees of automation. The link between working memory and degrees of automation
was theorised to come from the fact that different degrees of automation assume
different kinds of cognitive tasks from the user (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens,
2000); higher degrees of automation support the operator in decision-making which is
working memory-intensive because operators need to generate and compare different
courses of action (e.g., GPS guided route guidance) whereas lower degrees of
automation support the operator by taking away some of the information acquisition and
analysis properties of the task (e.g., vehicle check engine light notifies the operator of a
problem, however the user must diagnose the issue). They found a critical interaction
such that when automation degree was higher (calculating distances, narrowing choices,
and assigning priority for the user) low working memory individuals’ performance was

both more helped by automation that was correct and more harmed by automation
failures than high working memory individuals. Their study provided the first empirical
demonstration of the link between working memory capacity and behaviour with
automation of different degrees, however, this study was done only with younger adults.

1.3 Knowledge Gaps in the Study of Aging and Automation
Age-related declines in working memory are some of the most robust findings in
cognitive aging (e.g., Salthouse & Babcock, 1991, Verhaeghen & Salthouse, 1997;
Salthouse, 1992, 1996). However, the previously discussed studies examining working
memory and automated technologies have used a younger adult sample (e.g., de Visser,
Shaw, Mohamed-Ameen, & Parasuraman, 2010; Parasuraman, de Visser, Lin, and
Greenwood, 2012; Saqer, de Visser, Emfield & Parasuraman, 2011; [blinded], in
review). Ho, Wheatley, and Scialfa’s (2005) study that originally hypothesised the
critical role of age-related differences in working memory as an explanation for agerelated differences with automation did not directly measure working memory span but
merely inferred its role based on established literature on age differences in working
memory.
Another limitation of existing studies (e.g., Donmez, Boyle, Lee, & McGehee,
2006; Ezer, Fisk, & Rogers, 2008; Ho, Wheatley, Scialfa, 2005; McBride, Fisk, &
Rogers, 2011; Sanchez, Rogers, Fisk, & Rovira, 2012; Wiegmann, McCarley, Kramer,
& Wickens, 2006) is that they have all mostly focused on simpler, binary-state alerting
automation and have not examined the extent to which various degrees of automation
affect performance in older adults. The distinction between lower degree alerting
automation and higher degree decision automation is of major interest because there are
distinct human performance consequences with different degrees of automation (Crocoll
& Coury, 1990; Onnasch, Wickens, Li, & Manzey, 2014; Parasuraman & Manzey,

2010; Rovira, et al. 2007), especially with regard to working memory ability ([blinded],
in review). However, no extant research has examined how older adult’s performance
is affected by moving across this boundary.

2.0 Overview of the Experiment
The purpose of the current experiment was to address two significant gaps in the
research on older adults and automation: 1) how do individual differences in working
memory in older adults affect automation performance, and 2) extend the literature by
examining how older adults working memory abilities affect performance with different
degrees of automation.
Given the sparse amount of research on abilities, automation, and aging, our
hypotheses are generated by extrapolating findings from extant younger adult studies
and the wider cognitive aging literature. The most direct comparison can be made with
[blinded]’s (in review) study examining the performance of low and high working
memory span in younger adults.
(1) Consistent with previous literature, overall accuracy will be better when the
automation is correct compared to trials where the automation fails.
(2) Older adults will also show higher accuracy with reliable decision automation (a
higher degree of automation) compared to information automation (a lower
degree), reflecting the beneficial performance effects of higher, reliable
automation, (Onnasch et al., 2014).
(a) This benefit of higher degrees of reliable automation will be moderated
by individual differences in working memory abilities.
(3) But when the automation fails, performance will be worse with decision
compared to information automation, reflecting the consequences of not being

involved in the decision-making aspects of the task and thus being out of the
loop (Wickens, 1992).
(a) The magnitude of this performance penalty of failures of the decision
automation will be related to individual differences in working memory
abilities.
(4) Given prior research that has shown older adults’ generally increased
complacency and levels of trust in automation, we expect that measures of trust
will be strongly correlated to performance and reflective of complacency,
indicated as high levels of trust in automation regardless of its correctness.

2.1 Method
2.1.1 Participants
Forty-four community-dwelling older adults (24 females; mean age 70.0, SD = 3.19)
were recruited and were compensated $25 for their time. Data from two participants
were removed because their performance on the math portion of the working memory
test was less than 85%. Older adult characteristics are illustrated in Table 1.
[Table 1 about here]

2.1.2 Materials
Equipment. PC-compatible (Windows 7) computers running at 3.2 GHz with 4GB of
RAM were used with a 19-inch LCD monitor set at a resolution of 1024x1280 pixels.
Participants were seated approximately 18 inches from the monitor and interacted
primarily with a mouse (on the preferred side) and a keyboard.

Targeting Task. The task was a low-fidelity targeting simulation (Figure 1) used in
previous studies ([blinded], in review; Rovira, McGarry, & Parasuraman, 2007). The
task screen consisted of four areas: an overhead terrain grid (right), a target input area
with automated assistance (left), and a communications module (top-left). The terrain
grid displayed red enemy units (E1 to E3), green friendly units (A1 to A3), yellow
friendly battalion units (B1 to B3), and one orange headquarters unit (HQ). The task
was to assign the closest friendly unit to engage in combat with the most dangerous
enemy target. The criteria for most dangerous enemy unit was whether it was closest to
any friendly unit but also closest to HQ. Thus, if two enemy units were equally distant
from any other friendly units, the enemy unit closest to HQ was deemed most
dangerous. These criteria were derived from consulting military subject matter experts.
[Figure 1a and Figure 1b about here]
To aid participants with this task, the automation (lower-left) provided either a lower
degree of automation (termed information-analysis automation; Figure 1a) or a higher
degree of automation (decision-selection; Figure 1b). Information-analysis automation
displayed all pairs of friendly-enemy distances in an arbitrary order, alleviating the
participant from manually calculating distances but still requiring scanning and
comparison of the values to determine best pairing. It is considered a lower degree of
automation because it is automation at a lower stage: information automation (without a
direct pointer to a decision) and lower level (a complete set of all calculated distances).
Decision-selection automation also calculated the distances but ordered them by pair
distance and narrowed the displayed options to the top three, alleviating a major source
of working memory demand. It is considered a relatively higher degree of automation
because it represents automation at a higher stage: decision automation (facilitates
working memory by providing decision selections) and higher level (narrows the

calculated distances to a few). When the automation was not faulty, the top choice in
the table was always the best choice. These two degrees of automation were chosen
because they straddle the critical boundary between information and decision
automation where the negative performance effects of automation failures are most
apparent in the latter (Onnasch, Wickens, Li, & Manzey, 2013). This is because the
greater support provided by higher degrees of automation necessarily means that the
user is less engaged in the task, more “out of the loop” and thus is more affected by the
consequences of low situation awareness when faced with an automation failure
(Endsley & Kiris, 1995). Since the focus of this research was on age-related differences
with automation as it crosses the critical boundary between information and decision
automation, we did not include a manual or unaided condition.
During the task, participants could either use the assistance of the automation or
make their own enemy-friendly unit engagement decisions, but were required to
respond within 20s. Participants were able to verify the automation by reviewing the
terrain view and manually computing distances themselves by counting grid boxes.
After they made their selection, or if 20 seconds had elapsed, the trial ended and the
terrain map was replaced with a new grid of enemy, friendly, and HQ units. The effects
of automation on performance and complacency manifest themselves most strongly in
multitask situations (Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010) thus a secondary, non-automated
task was included. The task was to monitor the communications panel for a call for
communications (call sign) that appeared every 6s. Participants were required to click
on the ANSWER button every time their personal call sign appeared while they were
selecting units. This secondary task was always performed; there was no single task
condition.

Working memory measure. Working memory span was measured using the automated
operation span task (AOSPAN), a computerised version of the operation span memory
task (Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005). In the AOSPAN task, participants are
shown sequences of letters, one at a time. In between the letter presentation, they were
given a math problem and had to determine whether it was correct or not (Figure 2).
Participants were instructed to maintain at least an accuracy rate of 85% on the math
task. After the presentation of a set of letters and math problems, participants had to
recall the letters in the correct display sequence using a mouse. Running performance
feedback on the letter recall and math verification task was provided after each
response.
[Figure 2 about here]

Automation Attitude and Trust Measures. Pre-existing individual differences in
attitudes toward automation were measured with the Complacency Potential Rating
Scale (CPRS; Singh, Molloy, & Parasuraman, 1993). CPRS is a 16-item test designed
to measure the potential for complacency to common examples of automation (e.g.,
automated teller machines). Participants responded to the extent they agreed with
statements about automation on a scale of 1 to 5. The CPRS score was a sum of these
responses and ranged from 16 (low complacency potential) to 80 (high complacency
potential. Trust was measured using a 12 item questionnaire adapted from Jian, Bisantz,
and Drury (2000). The first five questions assessed negative attitudes toward
automation while the remaining 7 assessed positive attitudes. Trust was also measured
after every block by asking four questions adapted from Lee and Moray (1994). The
questions assessed the extent to which participants rated their trust in the automation,
their self-confidence during the task, the degree to which they relied on the automation,

and their belief that the automation improved their performance. Participants responded
by using an on-screen visual analogue scale ranging from 0 to 100.

2.1.3 Design and Procedure
The experiment was a 2 (degree of automation: information (low DOA), decision (high
DOA)) x 2 (automation correctness: correct, incorrect) within-subjects design.
Participants completed eight blocks of 20 trials each for a total of 160 trials. The
overall automation reliability was set at 80%; that is, in a block of 20 trials, the
automation provided correct assistance on 16 trials while providing incorrect assistance
on 4 trials. In an incorrect assistance trial, the automation provided faulty enemyfriendly distance information, thus the distance and best-pairing order (with decision
automation) were incorrect. The first automation failure did not occur until the 10th
trial, so that users would not discount the automation (Wickens & Xu, 2002).
Subsequent automation failures were distributed randomly throughout the remaining
trials. Presentation of each automation degree (information analysis or decision
selection) was blocked so that each block only presented one degree of automation, and
counterbalanced. History-based trust was assessed after every block. The dependent
variable was decision accuracy of enemy-friendly engagement selections. Decision
accuracy was calculated as the percentage of trials in which the participant correctly
selected the optimal enemy-friendly pairing.
Participants were tested in groups of up to 6 at a time on individual computers with a
mouse on their preferred side. After signing the informed consent, participants started
the cognitive ability tests. After all participants completed the tests, they were given
instructions about the decision-making task. They were also told that the automated
technology provided was very reliable but it was not perfect all the time. No other
information about the reliability was given. After these instructions, the participants

started 8 trials of practice (automation was correct on all practice trials: 4 informationanalysis and 4 decision-selection). Once the practice trials were completed, the
experimenter answered any questions before the participants started the actual task.
After completing the task, participants filled out the CPRS and trust questionnaire.

2.2 Results
To examine whether participants devoted a differential amount of effort to the
secondary communications task between the automation conditions, communications
task accuracy data was subjected to an analysis of variance (ANOVA). There was no
significant difference in communications task accuracy by automation condition
(information M = 0.52, SD = 0.27, decision M = 0.51, SD = 0.28, F(1,167)=0.01, p >
.05).

2.2.1 Correlations between Decision Accuracy, Trust, and Working Memory
We first computed correlations between trust and CPRS measures. (Table 2). The
correlation table shows that the history-based questions were correlated with each other
in the expected direction (i.e., trust was positively correlated with extent to which
participants “relied”). As expected, positive and negative trust were negatively
correlated, r = -.32. Finally, CPRS was not related to any history-based trust question
or positive and negative trust, indicating that it could be a construct unique from
specific attitudes toward automation (positive/negative trust). Correlations between
decision accuracy, trust, and working memory were computed (Table 3). Positive trust
was negatively correlated with accuracy when the automation failed, r = -.43, r = -.47,
respectively, indicating that more positive attitudes toward automation were associated
with lower accuracy when the automation failed (an indicator of complacency).
[Table 2 about here]

[Table 3 about here]
Decision accuracy on automation-correct trials with information automation was
not related to any trust measure. However, decision accuracy on automation-failure
trials with information automation was negatively correlated to their responses to the
history-based questions of 1) “how much did you trust”, 2) how much did you rely”,
and 4) “how much did the automation improve performance”, r = -.62, r = -.58, r = -.58,
respectively, indicating that high levels of trust were associated with worse performance
when the automation failed, indicative of bias or complacency (over trust). Ratings of
self confidence (question 3) were significantly positive correlated to accuracy when the
automation failed, r = 0.55, indicating that higher self-confidence was associated with
greater accuracy when the automation failed.
Decision accuracy on automation-correct trials with decision automation was
significantly correlated with trust, reliance, and beliefs that automation helped
performance, r = .37, r = .36, r = .37, respectively. When decision automation failed,
trust, reliance, and the belief that automation helped all negatively correlated with
accuracy, r = -.64, r = -.65, r = -.66, respectively, again, indicative of the detrimental
effects of complacency. Self-confidence was positively correlated to performance when
the automation failed, r = .56.
Decision accuracy when the automation was correct in information automation
and decision automation was significantly correlated with working memory, r = .44 and
r = .37, respectively, indicating that higher working memory was associated with
greater accuracy. We next probed the relationship between individual differences in
working memory and decision accuracy as a function of automation factors (degree and
automation correctness).

2.2.2 Multilevel models to further examine role of working memory
Multilevel modelling (MLM) was employed to examine the influence of individual
differences in working memory, degree ofautomation, and automation correctness on
decision accuracy. MLM was preferred over regression for several reasons. First,
MLMs are ideal for nested data structures (i.e., repeated measures), such as automationcorrect and automation-failure trials within a participant, as MLMs simultaneously
estimate both intra- and inter-individual (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). Second, as our
overall automation reliability was 80% (128 trials where the automation was correct, 32
trials where the automation failed per participant) there was a large difference in the
number of observations of this independent variable which is a problem with repeated
measures regressions but not for MLM (Neupert et al., 2006a, 2006b). Third,
regression is more likely to produce Type I errors with nested data, making MLM a
more conservative choice (Hox & Bechger, 1998; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002;
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Finally, MLM allows for the examination of critical crosslevel interactions, such as the interaction between the person-level predictor of working
memory ability and the trial-level predictors of automation degree and automation
correctness. Multilevel modelling was implemented using PROC MIXED through SAS,
version 9.4.
[Table 4 about here]
A two-level hierarchical model assessed the effects of the within-person
variables (level 1) of degree of automation and automation correctness, the betweenperson predictor (level 2) of working memory score, and their cross-level interactions
on decision accuracy in the task (Table 4). We used a model-building approach where
we first ensured there was significant variability at both levels to allow predictors to be
entered at those levels (Model 1), then added the within-participant predictors

manipulated in the task (Model 2), and finally added the between-participant predictor
of working memory score and controlled for CPRS score (Model 3). Each model was
compared to the previous using Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) values to ascertain
if the added predictors increased the quality of the model. Lower AIC values indicate
better model fit.

Model 1: No predictors. The first step was to run a fully unconditional model, one
without any predictors (Table 4: Model 1), to discover how much variance in decision
accuracy was due to within- (σ2) and between-participant (τ00) differences and whether
that variance was significantly high enough to try and explain using our predictors. The
unconditional model revealed significant variance at both levels: 90% of the variance
was at the within-person level (σ2 = 0.211, z = 54.94, p < .0001) and 10% of the
variance was at the between-person level (τ00 = 0.023, z = 4.16, p < .0001).

Model 2: Within-person variables. Model 2 revealed that automation correctness and
degree of automation explained 7% of the within-subject variance. Model fit using the
Akaike's information criterion (AIC) improved from 7903.8 to 7472.3. The model
revealed significant main effects of automation degree, F(1,6033) = 2.14, p = .033,
indicating that participant accuracy was greater with decision automation (M = 0.59, SD
= 0.30) compared to information automation (M = 0.50, SD = 0.25). The main effect of
automation correctness was also significant, F(1,6033) = 12.41, p < .0001), indicating
that accuracy was higher on automation-correct trials (M = 0.67, SD = 0.21) versus
automation-failure trials (M = 0.42, SD = 0.29). The two-way interaction of degree of
automation and automation correctness was also significant. F(1,6033) = 2.04, p = .042,
illustrated in Figure 3. Pairwise comparisons (Sidak-adjusted for multiple
comparisons) to decompose the two-way interaction showed that when the automation

failed, decision accuracy was not significantly different between information
automation (M = 0.3, SD = 0.26) and decision automation (M = 0.44, SD = 0.30), but
when the automation was correct, accuracy was significantly higher, F(1,41) =43.7, p <
.05, with decision automation (M = 0.74, SD = 0.21) compared to information
automation (M = 0.61, SD = 0.20).
[Figure 3 about here]
These results partially support “conventional wisdom” (Onnasch, Wickens, Li,
& Manzey, 2014), based on studies of younger adults, that higher degrees of correct
automation increasingly benefit performance but higher degrees of automation, when
the automation fails, increasingly harm performance. We observed the performanceenhancing effects of higher degrees of correct automation in older adults but not the
greater performance decrement from higher degrees of automation when it failed.
Model 3 was added to examine the contribution of working memory ability on
performance as a function of degree and automation correctness.

Model 3: Cross-level interactions. We expected older adults with lower working
memory ability to depend more on the automation, and thus perform more poorly on
trials where the automation failed compared to older adults with higher working
memory ability. A third model was conducted to include working memory ability to
examine this hypothesised cross-level interaction.
Model 3 returned similar effects to Model 2 regarding the within-participant
predictors. A cross-level interaction was also present, where working memory ability
interacted with automation correctness, F(1,6030) = 20.68, p < .0001) but not degree of
automation. Contrasts showed that, contrary to expectations, when the automation
failed, low and high working memory participants’ accuracy did not significantly differ,
t(6030)=0.71, p=.478, but when the automation was correct, higher working memory

participant’s accuracy was higher than lower working memory participants,
t(6030)=3.83, p <.0001. Both low and high working memory groups had significantly
higher accuracy when the automation was correct compared to when it failed (low
working memory participants: t(6030)=9.00, p <.0001; high working memory
participants: t(6030)=18.83, p <.0001). Model fit using AIC improved from 7472.3 to
7471.8, indicating the benefit of including working memory ability as a predictor.
The results of Model 3 showed that working memory ability moderated
performance on automation-correct trials. Older adults with higher working memory
performed better when the automation was correct compared to those with lower
working memory. But working memory was unrelated to accuracy when the
automation failed. This is partially consistent with the results of [blinded] (in review)
who found that with correct information automation, high working memory younger
adults outperformed those with low working memory. We observed the same pattern
but regardless of degree of automation. [blinded] found that when the automation
failed, high working memory younger adults were able still maintain a performance
advantage compared to low working memory younger adults. We did not observe this
benefit of high working memory; all older adults, regardless of working memory level,
performed poorly when the automation failed. This suggests that the reduced level of
working memory ability in older adults (even at the high end) compared to younger
adults was unable to compensate for automation failures.

3.0 Discussion
The present study was designed to address two significant gaps in the literature on aging
and automation: 1) how does working memory affect performance with automation in
older adults, and 2) how does working memory interact with degree of automation and
automation failures to affect performance in older adults? Examining the

ability/performance relationships showed that for older adults, working memory was
significantly related to performance but in contrast to previous research, independent of
degree of automation. In addition, higher span older adults’ performance benefited
from correct automation whereas lower span older adults did not. However, when the
automation failed, all older adult’s performance, regardless of working memory span,
declined.
How do we interpret these findings in light of [blinded]’s (in review) experiment
with younger adults? When the automation failed, [blinded] found that the higher span
younger adults were able to maintain a performance advantage over the lower span
group; that is, the low spans’ performance declined with automation failures, but the
high span group declined less. They interpreted this as a kind of “buffering effect” of
having high working memory against the negative performance effects of failures of
automation.
Working memory is only expected to exert an influence on performance only
when the task requires controlled processing, or the ability to override automatic
tendencies (Unsworth & Engle, 2007; Rosen & Engle, 1998). This suggests that the
nature of the buffering effect found in [blinded]’s high working memory group might be
an enhanced ability to deploy controlled processing resources or to suppress intrusive
thoughts or behaviours (Conway, Cowan, & Bunting, 2001; Kane, Bleckley, Conway,
& Engle, 2001; Cantor & Engle, 1993). Specifically, in the context of facing an
automation failure, having higher working memory abilities could mean an enhanced
ability to detect the automation failure, the ability to manually carry out the task without
automation, or an increased ability to suppress an automatic bias to comply with
automation (Mosier & Skitka, 1996). Since we did not observe a performance
difference (on trials where the automation failed) between low and high working

memory older adults, it suggests that the buffering effect of high working memory
observed by [blinded] can be localised to a component of working memory, or other
mediator, that is sensitive to age-related declines (e.g., processing speed versus storage
capacity; Salthouse & Babcock, 1991). Future research should further isolate the exact
component of working memory that is responsible for the buffering effect.
The current results also reinforce the importance of perceptions of automation
(e.g., trust) in addition to cognitive ability factors in explaining age-related differences
in performance (Czaja, et al., 2006). As the ability/performance correlations showed,
trust, in addition to working memory, was significantly associated with performance in
older adults. But can age-related differences in the perception of automation, and the
task environment, also explain older adults’ characteristic behaviour with automation?
In an experiment examining reliance on human versus automation, Lyon and Stokes
(2012) found that operators relied more on automation over human collaborators when
the perceived risk of the task was higher compared to lower. Extrapolating their results
to aging, can older adults’ reliance on automation, and inability to compensate during
failure, be explained by their risk perceptions when interacting with automation? Older
adults have reduced familiarity with technology compared to younger adults (Olson,
O’Brien, Rogers, & Charness, 2011), thus, they may perceive most interactions with
automated technology as relatively higher risk or uncertain leading to their increased
reliance on automation. Additionally, slowing of perception, and cognitive processes
associated with aging (Salthouse, 1991) may cause older adults to perceive increased
time-pressure in situations where younger adults would not. It is for this reason that
allowing older adults increased time is one of the most suggested age-related design
recommendations (e.g., Fisk, Rogers, Charness, Czaja, & Sharit, 2009; Kelley &

Charness, 1994; Mayhorn, Stronge, McLaughlin, & Rogers, 2004; Pak & McLaughlin,
2011).
The idea that users, including older adults, may rely more on pre-existing and
automatic biases or heuristics (such as automation heuristics; Mosier & Skitka, 1996)
under situations of uncertainty was found in an experiment by Pak, McLaughlin, and
Bass (2014). Thus, age-related complacency and bias with automation may not be a
direct consequence of low working memory, but may be mediated by older adult’s overuse of, or inability to inhibit a “trust technology” heuristic in situations of uncertainty or
time pressure; an adaptive strategy when resources are low or risk perception is high, to
guide behaviour (Bahner, Hüper, & Manzey, 2008; Mosier & Skitka, 1996).

4.0 Conclusion
Although higher degrees of automation, when that automation is correct, are
beneficial for low-span young adults (e.g., Onnasch, Wickens, Li, & Manzey, 2014), it
is automation correctness, rather than degree, that seems most crucial for older adults.
Short of simply increasing the reliability of automation that will be used by older adults,
these results suggest that the design of automation intended for use by older adults
should enhance the display of the likelihood the automation is correct but also assist the
older user in recovering from automation failure. The importance of automation
correctness is conceptually consistent with research that has shown that older adults are
keenly aware of the reliability of technology and that it negatively affects their
perceptions of technology (Mitzner et al., 2010). Prior research has shown that the
display of such information is beneficial for trust calibration and reducing automation
bias in younger adults (McGuirl & Sarter, 2006). The current results suggest that such a
display might be especially helpful to older adults by alleviating the working memory
demands of recovering from a failure of the automation (environmental support;

Morrow & Rogers, 2008). Promising research suggests that providing younger adults
with reliability information that is artificially higher than normal might actually
properly calibrate beliefs and expectations about automation (Barg-Walkow & Rogers,
2015). Such a strategy may also work with older adults because it may take advantage
of their somewhat increased tendency to trust automation but takes into account their
tendency to estimate reliability downward (Sanchez, Fisk, & Rogers, 2004). Their miscalibration of reliability may come from the inability to remember and aggregate past
automation performance due to working memory capacity limitations. One of the more
unexpected findings was that we did not observe a larger performance decrement with
decision automation compared to information automation. A meta-analysis of
automation studies (Onnasch, Wickens, Li, & Manzey, 2014) provided support for the
notion that higher degrees of automation, when that automation is correct, increasingly
help performance but that higher degrees of automation, when that automation fails,
should increasingly harm performance. The rationale is that with higher degrees of
automation, where the task is allocated more to automation, the user is likely to suffer
from out-of-the-loop unfamiliarity and is thus unprepared to resume manual control
when automation fails. We found that older adults benefited from higher degrees of
correct automation, consistent with the literature, but they were not increasingly harmed
by higher degrees of automation, when that automation failed. The lack of greater
performance harm from automation failures at higher degrees of automation is unlikely
to be a floor effect as all older adults were still able to maintain a level of performance
well above chance 1. The detrimental effects of different degrees of automation

1

Participants were presented with 160 total trials (80 information automation, 80 decision
automation). Information automation presented 9 possible pairings (1/9 chance of
choosing correct pairing) while decision automation presented 3 possible pairings (1/3

typically become most evident under higher workload (Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010),
thus a future study might examine older adults’ interaction with automation in more
demanding situations to fully visualise the effect of higher degrees of automation on
older adults’ performance.
Given the finding that degree of automation is less impactful of older adults’
performance with automation compared to its correctness, another recommendation for
the design of automation intended for older adults might be to provide a higher degree
of automation rather than a lower degree. The logic of this recommendation is that the
older adults in our sample did not seem to be subject to the “lumberjack effect”
(increased performance with automation of higher degree that is reliable, but
catastrophic performance with automation of higher degree that is unreliable; Onnasch
et al., 2014) as younger adults were. Older adults received the positive benefits of
higher degrees of correct automation but curiously were not subject to the negative
effects of incorrect, higher degree automation.
Another limitation of our experiment was that the automation paradigm used in
this experiment was not able to differentiate whether a response reflected compliance
and reliance behaviour. Compliance is a behaviour where the operator adheres to
unreliable automation while reliance is where the operator does not act (verify) when
the automation fails to alert. While the concepts are typically studied most often with
alerting automation, the concepts have an equivalent in some forms of decision
automation as well (commission versus omission errors; Manzey, Reichenbach, &
Onnasch, 2012; Skitka, Mosier, & Burdick, 1999). Given that compliance and reliance

chance). But within each of those 80 trials, automation failed on 16 trials (64 correct; 80%
reliability). Thus, chance performance in this study was calculated to be, [(1/9) * 0.8 +
(1/3) * 0.8] / 2 = 0.18

behaviours may be theoretically unique (Meyer, 2004) and have different causes and
effects (Dixon, Wickens, & McCarley, 2007), a future experiment might examine the
role of age-related differences in working memory and other abilities specifically on
older adult’s pattern of compliance and reliance behaviours.
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Figure 1a. Information analysis automation. All friendly (A) and enemy (E) distances
are calculated and presented but ordered arbitrarily by enemy label.

Figure 1b. Decision selection automation. All A to E distances are calculated but are
ordered by distance and filtered to only show the top three.

Figure 2. Operation span task sequence

Figure 3. Accuracy as a function of degree of automation and correctness

Table 1. Participant characteristics
Mean
Age
Working memorya
Shipley vocabularyb
Digit symbol substitutionc
Complacency potentiald
Self reported healthe

70
23.29
36.02
1773.19
46.83
3.74

SD
3.19
14.94
2.31
422.1
3.66
0.86

Note: aTotal number of correctly recalled letter sets (maximum score 75;
Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005; higher is better). bTotal correct
(maximum score = 40; Shipley, 1986; higher is better). cTime to identify an
incorrect trial in milliseconds (Wechsler, 1997; lower is better). dTendency for
complacency (Singh, Molloy, & Parasuraman, 1993; higher is more). e1 = Poor, 2
= Fair, 3 = Good, 4 = Very Good, 5 = Excellent

Table 2. Intercorrelations between trust and performance
Information Analysis

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

How much did you trust
How much did you rely
Your self confidence
How much did auto. improve perf.
Complacency potential (CPRS)b
Negative trustc
Positive trustc
Accuracy

1
-0.75
-0.29
0.77
0.02
-0.05
0.63
0.25

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

How much did you trust
How much did you rely
Your self confidence
How much did auto. improve perf.
Complacency potential (CPRS)b
Negative trustc
Positive trustc
Accuracy

-0.88
-0.43
0.91
-0.02
-0.01
0.55
0.37

2
--0.58
0.92
-0.12
0.08
0.44
0.24

Correct
3
4

--0.53
-0.03
-0.07
-0.18
-0.12

-0.04
0.01
0.48
0.30

5

6

--0.25
0.13
0.11

--0.32
-0.15

7

1
2
3
-0.75
--0.29 -0.58
-0.78
0.92 -0.53
0.01 -0.12 -0.02
-0.05 0.07 -0.07
0.63
0.45 -0.19
0.16 -0.62 -0.58 0.55
Decision Selection

Correct
--0.47
0.95
-0.05
0.04
0.45
0.36

--0.52
0.03
-0.12
-0.14
-0.19

-0.03
-0.06
0.47
0.37

Incorrect
4
5

0.04
0.00
0.48
-0.58

--0.25
0.13
0.00

6

7

--0.32
-0.08

-0.43

--0.32
-0.15

-0.47

Incorrect

--0.25
0.13
-.16

--0.32
-0.21

0.29

-0.89
-0.43
0.91
-0.02
-0.01
0.54
-0.64

--0.48
0.96
-0.06
0.04
0.44
-0.66

--0.53
0.04
-0.12
-0.14
0.55

-0.03
-0.05
0.46
-0.66

--0.25
0.13
0.04

Note. Bolded items are significant, p < .05. aadapted from Lee & Moray (1994). bTendency for complacency (Singh, Molloy, & Parasuraman,
1993; higher is more). cadapted from Jian, Bisantz, and Drury (2000).

Table 3. Intercorrelations and descriptive statistics of decision accuracy, trust, and
working memory

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Information
Decision
Analysis
Selection
Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect
5
6
How much did you trust
0.25
-0.62
0.37
-0.64
How much did you rely
0.24
-0.58
0.36
-0.66
Your self confidence
-0.11
-0.19
0.55
0.55
How much did auto. improve perf.
0.29
-0.58
0.37
-0.66
Complacency potential (CPRS)b
0.11
0.00
0.16
0.04
c
Negative dispositional trust
-0.15
-0.08
-0.21
-0.15
-0.25
Positive dispositional trustc
0.16
0.29
0.13 -0.32
-0.43
-0.47

8 Working memory (OSPAN)d

7

8

-0.11
-0.11
0.22 -0.18 0.10
-0.44
0.37
Mean 0.62
0.39
0.73
0.45
46.80 14.90 26.70 23.29
SD 0.20
0.26
0.21
0.30
3.70 7.30
9.20
3.19
Note. Bolded items are significant, p < .05. aadapted from Lee & Moray (1994). bTendency for complacency
(Singh, Molloy, & Parasuraman, 1993; higher is more). cadapted from Jian, Bisantz, and Drury (2000). dTotal
number of correctly recalled letter sets (maximum score 75; Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005; higher is
better).

Table 3. Unstandardised Coefficients of Multilevel Models of the Within- and Betweenperson Effects of Predictors on Decision Accuracy
Model 1
Unconditional Model

Fixed effects

Estimate

SE
0.029

CPRS Score

0.002

0.007

Working Memory Score (WM)

-0.001

0.002

0.629 ***

0.024

Estimate
0.379 ***

SE

Model 3
Within- and Betweenparticipant Predictors
Estimate
0.380 ***

Intercept

SE

Model 2
Within-participant
Predictors
0.030

Between-person

Within-person
Automation Degree (AD)
Automation Correctness (AC)
AD x AC

0.054 *
0.250 ***

0.025

0.054 *
0.249 ***

0.025

0.020

0.058 *

0.028

0.058 *

0.028

0.020

Cross-level
-0.001

AD x WM
AC x WM
AC x AD x WM

0.002

0.006 ***
0.001

0.001
0.002

Random Effects
σ2

0.211

0.004

0.196

0.004

0.194

0.003

τoo

0.023

0.005

0.022

0.005

0.020

0.005

AIC

7903.8

Model fit statistic
7472.3

7471.8

Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; Working memory and CPRS scores were grand-mean centred. SE indicates standard
error.

